Battles of the War on Terror Part I
Victory at Basra, March/April 2008
By the beginning of 2008, President Bush’s ‘surge’ in Iraq was yielding tangible results. Thanks largely to the influx of American troops; Al Qaida was on the run in Diyala, Salahadin, and Babil provinces north of Baghdad. The Sunni population, tired of being the target of Al Qaida attacks, fielded thousands of militia who fought and expelled the terrorists from the western province of Anbar. During the course of the year, the Iraqi Army expanded from 10 to 13 divisions and engaged Al Qaida and other insurgent groups in countless battles. American and Iraqi troops were systematically clearing Baghdad, bringing a sharp reduction in terrorist violence there.
The biggest problem yet remaining was the Shia Sadarist Bloc and its militia, the Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) or Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al Sadr. The anti-American cleric, who enjoyed massive military and financial support from Iran, was part of the Iraqi ruling coalition, counting 30 members in the 275 seat parliament. Sadr’s militia controlled the Shia slum of Sadr City in northern Baghdad and maintained a strong presence in every southern town, most notably at the port of Basra, abandoned by the British in the summer of 2007. As many as 17,000 Mahdi fighters roamed the streets and battled other Shia factions for control of the city. Iraqi forces there,1 Brigade, 10 Division, were not strong enough to confront the Mahdi and unwilling to do so anyway as they had strong ties with the Shia militia.
This situation was deemed unacceptable by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who saw Sadr’s intransigence as a direct threat to the rule of law and a roadblock to political reconciliation with Sunni and Kurdish factions. In December 2007, the prime minister decided to act. Al Maliki relieved 1/10 brigade and replaced it with 14 Division (two brigades taken from other formations joined in February by the brand new 52 Brigade) and 3 Tank Brigade, 9 Division. Thousands of police and a battalion of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces were also dispatched to Basra.
With his troops assembled, at the end of March, Prime Minister Maliki decided the time was right to confront al-Sadr. He travelled to Basra to personally oversee operations and informed General David Petraeus of the plan, who it should be noted, advised against the attack. Dubbed Operation Sawlat al-Fursan - Knight’s Charge, the attack began as an exclusively Iraqi affair with almost no coalition support. On 25 March, 14 Iraqi Army Division moved into Basra’s northern and eastern districts. There was heavy fighting in Basra’s northern neighborhoods and along Route 8 near the Basra Gate in the northwest. At the same time 3/9 Tank Brigade advanced from the south along Route 8. 3/9’s advance was halted here by Improvised Explosive Devices and Mahdi fighters armed with RPGs and mortars. One eyewitness told Voices of Iraq, ‘Gunmen forced tanks and Hummer vehicles to withdraw from the main street, and they [destroyed] some of them, setting them on fire.’ When IA forces pressed deeper into the city against the Sadr strongholds of Timmiyah and Jimhariya in the city center, they met stiff resistance from Mahdi militia. Rather than advanced into the disputed areas, IA forces cordoned them off.
The Iraqis were clearly surprised by the staunch resistance offered by the JAM. Many soldiers and officers simply refused to fight and some even surrendered to the Mahdi Army. This was especially true of the Iraqi police and the untested 52 Brigade, which lost more than 900 men to desertion. A stalemate ensued, with the international media depicting Knight’s Charge as an unfolding disaster for the Maliki government.
The fighting in Basra triggered an uprising of the Mahdi Army throughout southern Iraq. Mahdi fighters took to the streets in the cities of Amarah, Diwaniyah, Hillah, Karbala, Kut, Najaf, and Nassiriyah. Though initially caught off guard, IA forces in these towns performed admirably and a general counterattack began mid week. In Karbala, units of the formerly unreliable 10 Division surrounded known Mahdi safehouses and forced the surrender of 50 gunmen, including their commander. A further 12 were killed in firefights throughout the city. Nassiriyah saw heavy fighting involving two of 10 Division’s Special Troops Battalions which killed 85 Mahdi Fighters, wounded 200, and captured 100 more in several running gun battles. Government forces lost 7 dead and 44 wounded. In Hillah, Mahdi forces attacked an Iraqi Special Weapons and Tactics Unit holding a key intersection, the ensuing battle killed 14 fighters and wounded another 20 in exchange for nine SWAT members. Further patrols led to more gun battles and the capture of 85 Mahdi fighters.
There was also heavy fighting in Baghdad, where the JAM hit the Green Zone with mortar and rocket fire, doing little physical damage but winning a significant propaganda victory as the attacks were widely reported in the press. American and Iraqi forces spent several days tracking down Mahdi mortar and rocket teams, resulting in dozens of sharp firefights, nine alone on 26 March:
12:00, eastern Baghdad: terrorists attack American checkpoint (3rd BCT, 4th Infantry Division).
17:00, southern Baghdad: Iraqi National Police (5th Brigade, 2nd NDP Division) kill terrorist firing on guard tower.
19:45, north of Baghdad: air strike on terrorist concentration.
20:00, southern Baghdad: American patrol (4th BCT, 1st Infantry Division) engaged by terrorist cell.
22:30, eastern Baghdad: American patrol (1st Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment) comes under and returns fire. Unit later engaged by second terrorist cell in northeastern Baghdad. Airstrike called in.
23:00, eastern Baghdad: airstrike on terrorist concentration. At same time, patrol comes under fire and calls in air strike against terrorist cell.
23:00 (approx.) eastern Baghdad: Troops from 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division engage terrorist cell and soon after engage in second firefight.
The next day an undeterred Mahdi Army engaged American and Iraqi forces in more than a dozen firefights throughout Baghdad, losing 42 killed. At least nine more gun battles were fought on the morning of 28 March, killing 39 Mahdi fighters. Another 20 were killed in seven skirmishes on the 29th. In seven actions fought on 30 March, 48 Mahdi Fighters were killed and 22 captured.
Despite the widespread fighting, Prime Minister Maliki refused to back down and instead committed more troops to battle. These included the Iraqi Quick Reaction Force (1 IA Division), Hillah SWAT, and the National Police Emergency Response Unit. He also further split Sadarist forces by offering a general amnesty to all those who lay down their arms and emphasized that Charge of Knights was directed at ‘criminal elements’ rather than the Sadrist Bloc at large. Iraqi air force transports flew supplies down to Basra. American advisors were sent to help, while British and American artillery was brought to bear on Mahdi strong points. Thusly reinforced, IA units held their posts and engaged the JAM inflicting devastating losses in Basra amounting to 210 killed, 600 wounded, and 155 prisoners. Iraqi forces suffered 15 dead and 400 wounded, a lopsided total probably due to the availability of body armor in IA units.
A week of fighting resulted in more than 1,000 Mahdi casualties throughout the country. On 29 March, al-Sadr called for a truce and ordered the Mahdi Army off the streets. Despite al-Sadr’s call, Prime Minister Maliki vowed to press the attack. Even before Sadr’s call, ISOF and Hillah SWAT were active in Basra. On 29 March, ISOF fought its way inside Hayaniyah, assaulted a targeted safe house, and fought its way back out, killing 22 Mahdi fighters in the action. The next day Hillah SWAT captured 20 arms smugglers, two boats, a stash of weapons and ammunition, and $262,000 in cash. On 31 March, ISOF hit a school the JAM used as a staging area, killing 14. On 3 April, a trio of operations by ISOF and HIllah SWAT killed 7 and netted 16 prisoners.
Following the emerging success in Basra, on 1 April, IA troops entered the ports of Khour al-Zubair and Umm Qasr, encountering no resistance. By then, IA forces controlled most of Basra, except for the al-Sadr stronghold of Hayaniyah in the center west area of the city. Even there, IA troops made a show of force, driving through Hayaniyah unopposed, save for a single IED attack. When Knight’s Charge was renewed on 15 April, the neighborhood was taken in a combined assault by the 1st Iraqi QRF and 14 Division. This led to renewed and lopsided fighting throughout the country, with the JAM losing more than 150 fighters in Baghdad alone. Scores of Mahdi fighters were killed or captured in the following days. With his casualties heavy and his prestige suffering greatly, on 10 May, al-Sadr agreed to let IA troops into Sadr city and recognized the authority of Maliki’s government.
Operation Knight’s Charge was the first stage in the Iraqi government’s crackdown on the various Shia militias. In the opening phases, Maliki made two nearly catastrophic mistakes: giving General Petraeus late warning of the attack and relying upon the new 14 Division. Also troubling is the apparent need for American and British advisors to accompany IA forces in the field, indicating that the Iraqi officer corps still had some ways to go before it is capable of leading on its own. That being said, the positives of Knight’s Charge outweigh the negatives. While hundreds of troops deserted, the majority fought (as indicated by the 415 casualties suffered in Basra) and inflicted heavy losses on the Mahdi Army. In response to the desertions, several officers were relieved of command and more than 1,300 men were dismissed from duty, a positive development showing that the Iraqi Army could police and improve itself. Throughout the rest of the country, IA troops stood their ground and exacted a heavy price from the Mahdi Army. The 1st Iraqi Quick Response Division lived up to its name. Overall, the Iraqi army performed well, making Knight’s Charge an important victory.